




Mandate related

26/04/2017

European Union Agency for Network and Information Security



Context



FRANCE

10:57 (Paris time) IN THE PAPERS ▶ WATCH LIVE French Presidential Elections 2017 | hacking | cyber crime France France takes steps to prevent an election hack attack f Share < 299 🕑 Tweet G+ Share < 0 🚭 🕂 🕁 submit 👔 Share 187 www.politico.eu/article/dutch-election-news-russian-hackers-r © Fred Tanneau, AFP | Electronic voting during local election French port city of Brest on March 22, 2015

Latest update : 2017-01-16

Alarmed by allegations of Russian me 2016 US presidential race, French aut warned political parties against the th attacks as the country prepares to ele president in May.

A US president-elect who may be compromised by a foreign power. A presidential election marred by cyber attacks, leaks and interference. An



Smartphones, PCs and TVs: the everyday devices targeted by the CIA

Documents published by WikiLeaks reveal extent of intelligence agency's capability for targeting the public



WikiLeaks describe CIA using techniques 'to bypass the encryption' of a number of popular encrypted chat apps such as WhatsApp and Signal, in addition to exploiting a vulnerability in Samsung TVs. Photograph: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg/Getty Images

f 💙 🖾 Alex Hern 🎐

Hacking

Dutch go old school against Russian hacking

A small, tech-savvy nation gives up on computers in this month's parliamentary elections.

By LAURENS CERULUS | 3/5/17, 6:49 PM CET | Updated 3/8/17, 8:10 AM CET

Early voters cast their ballot in a flower shop furnished as a polling station during Dutch local elections in Castricum in 2014 | Olaf Kraak/AFP via Getty Images

53 Shares 028 Shares

THE HAGUE, Netherlands — Better safe than sorry.

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30 SHARES

Malicious intent – cyber attacks





Deliberate action(s)

- Development stage -> malicious logic
- Operational stage -> Intrusion

Using same infrastructure/networks/space

Targeting assets: systems/infrastructures/information/human

Exploiting weak links

*Cyber espionage » state espionage (intelligence, state actors) or industrial espionage (commercial actors)





European dimension


Review of

EU Cyber Security Strategy 2013





Need for a renewed EU cybersecurity governance (I)



*Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013) 1 final, <u>http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1667</u>

Need for a renewed EU cybersecurity governance (II) ***,

Covered by strategic objective Covered by ENISA work programme¹

Global not only EU focused

Priority areas of overlap

		EC's strategy	ENISA's strategy	EUROPOL's strategy	CEPOL's strategy	EUCPN's strategy	CERT EU's strategy	EEAS's strategy	EDPS's strategy	BEREC's strategy	ITU's strategy
Ensure effective governance and coordination		\checkmark	 ✓ 	\checkmark					 ✓ 	 Image: A start of the start of	
	Identification of critical assets		\checkmark				✓				~
Build	Identification of potential attackers	\checkmark	\checkmark				✓				✓
situational awareness	Identification of vulnerabilities	\checkmark	\checkmark				✓				✓
	Balancing residual risk with risk appetite		- Marine								***
	Law, policies and regulation	\checkmark	\checkmark					\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	
Prepare and	Standards, guidelines and definitions	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark				✓
prevent	R&D, education and awareness	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				\checkmark	\checkmark	✓
	Active defence		1. Star								***
Withstand, recover	Government facilitation and support	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			\checkmark				\checkmark
and respond	Direct government action	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark			\checkmark				\checkmark
Ensure effici and coopera	ent information sharing tion	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	~	\checkmark		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

1 work programme only assessed for ENISA activities

SOURCE: ENISA Work Programme 2015; EUROPOL, CEPOL and EUCPN strategy and work programme 2015




Topics to be consider during Cyber security strategy review ENISA proposal





Positioning ENISA activities





ENISA evaluation. Drivers for change, SWOT analysis



	Strengths		Weaknesses		
•	Landscape view – unique position to analyse how all MS are doing and communicate back	•	Growth – pace of growth of budget and resources does not match pace of demand for ENISA involvement in new areas		
•	ndependence – ENISA seen as an independent agency		Influence – ENISA has limited influence over industry		
•	with no commercial or political bias A facilitator – ENISA focuses on collaboration and	•	Impact – as with other EU institutions, ENISA needs a better methodology for tracking and understanding impact and		

- Needs-driven ENISA remains agile and able to respond ٠ to changing stakeholder needs
- Cybersecurity excellence at several levels, covering the complete security lifecycle

External

Opportunities

Internal

community-building

- SPOC opportunity for ENISA to be the primary/coordinating EU cybersecurity body
- Cybersecurity marketplace a role for ENISA in developing and supporting European cybersecurity products and services
- Public-private partnerships ENISA could be supporting ٠ and developing PPPs, e.g. leveraging the results of research and exploiting opportunities for EU products and services in the cybersecurity market
- Technology development opportunity for ENISA to be the reference body on cybersecurity implications from IoT, smart, mobile, AI
- Privacy and data protection -ENISA could be given a role in assisting MS and EU in addressing the technical challenges of implementing data protection

Threats

addressing market needs

- Fragmentation the EU cybersecurity policy space has no coherent governance structure that includes all EU players in a complementary manner
- Strategic outlook difficulties in executing a long-term vision due to regulatory constraints and overlapping mandates (other agencies/bodies claiming to have expertise and ownership of cybersecurity)

Priorities / strategic themes ENISA paper on *Cybersecurity beyond 2020*



Organic growth

• continuing the evolution of the functions of the Agency to address the latest cybersecurity challenges,

Policy advice

• provision of strategic policy advice to the EU institutions and MS in relation to cybersecurity,

Information and capability-building

• ENISA as the EU Cybersecurity Information Hub offering high quality cybersecurity analysis and training,

Cybersecurity lifecycle

 getting more involved in the complete cybersecurity lifecycle, including practical, "hands-on" support and an incident response (coordination) capacity,

Economics of cybersecurity

 including better engagement with industry to leverage economic opportunities in the EU from cybersecurity,

Standards and certification

 ENISA developing and promoting cybersecurity standards, managing certifications, or (possibly) evolving to a standardisation and/or certification body.



CYBER SECURITY GLOBAL SUPPORT

- Collaboration, Community building, Capacity building,
- CIIP, Network and information Security, Data Protection





Thank you



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