




## UA CRISIS: OBSERVED THREATS AND INCIDENTS

**ENISA TELECOM SECURITY FORUM** 

Stefano de Crescenzo Head of Sector Operations and Situational Awareness - ENISA

29 | 06 | 2022



## ENISA CYBER CRISES CONTRIBUTION

### Support Preparation and Response



Support CSIRT Network and CyCLONe by providing active secretariat



Execute training and exercise



Contribute to develop SOP, policies, methodologies and tools for cyber crisis management



Contribute to Common Situational Awareness



Provide Expert Advisors role



Provide infrastructure for information exchange



### EU CYBER CRISIS RESPONSE























Joint Publication

Structured Cooperation between CERT-EU and ENISA TLP:WHITE | 14/02/2022 | JP-22-01

#### Boosting your Organisation's Cyber Resilience

Joint Publication 22-01

#### **Executive summary**

Based on the continuously increasing threat level ENISA, The EU Agency for Cybersecurity, and CERT-EU, the CERT of all the EU institutions, bodies and agencies, strongly encourage all public and private sector organisations in the EU to apply, at a minimum, the cybersecurity best practices hereunder.

ENISA and CERT-EU remain confident that, by applying this set of recommendations in a consistent, systematic manner, organisations in the EU will be able to substantially improve their cybersecurity posture and enhance their overall attack resilience.




# OBSERVED THREATS AND INCIDENTS TO EU











### KEY OBSERVATIONS

- Industrial wiper malware was used against UA targets with very limited spill-over effects.
- Viasat incident had the biggest spill-over effect with several ten thousand dysfunctional satellite terminals across multiple industry sectors emanating from the initial attack.
- Phishing/Spear-phishing continues from various threat actors picking war related themes of interest to target groups.
- Hacker groups like hacktivists, cyber partisans, and ransomware operators joined the conflict by taking sides and continue to conduct cyber operations against organisations of interest.
- Disinformation and information manipulation operations continue in support of RU actions.



## **HACKTIVISM**





# ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE 2021





# THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

Agamemnonos 14, Chalandri 15231 Attiki, Greece





