

Improving Resilience in Public eCommunication Networks

ENISA – European Network and Information
Security Agency

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Resilience



The ability of a system to provide & maintain an **acceptable level of service** in face of faults (*unintentional, intentional, or naturally caused*) affecting normal operation.

Network resources resilience

- ★ The main aim of resilience is for faults **to be invisible to users.**
- ★ A resilient network must guarantee protection and / or restoration schemes.
- ★ Real-Time Applications Demand that Resilient end-to-end Network Services Be Extended Consistently Across the Network.
- ★ The classification of a networks resilience has to be given from the **availability and performance perspective.**

Performance metrics

- ★ Measure the performance of their networks at different levels.
 - ★ per-port metrics
 - ★ end-user metrics
- ★ Performance metrics are as follows:
 - ★ Connectivity
 - ★ Delay (both round-trip and one-way)
 - ★ Packet loss
 - ★ Jitter or delay variation
 - ★ Application response time
- ★ Measurable SLA metrics

Resilient design

- ★ A resilient network design aims to remove single points of failure in network equipment.
- ★ Provide multiple paths through networks, while maintaining visibility and controllability to higher levels.



Dynamic Restoration

★ Dynamic Restoration:


- ★ Searching for the shortest path between source and destination nodes, skipping the failed network element, link or node.
- ★ No prior knowledge on which route to choose.

★ Scalable Routing Protocols:

- ★ Handle growing amounts of work in a graceful manner.
- ★ $O(\log N)$ rule.


Redundant links

- ★ Provide several paths to a given destination.
- ★ Maximize network reliability and availability.
- ★ Core links and mission-critical information exchanges.
- ★ Load Balancing to optimize costs.
 - ★ **SLA** ?



Resilient transmission media

- ★ The cabling must follow standards.
 - ★ TIA-942, builds on TIA-568 and TIA-569 and specifies a generic, permanent telecommunication cabling system.
- ★ Use geographically separate paths for connections.
 - ★ Information about physical routing of cables may be hard to obtain.
 - ★ Cross-selling of fibre and ducts is common.



Selected Technologies

★ MPLS

- ★ OSI Layer 2.5 technology.
- ★ Used by operators in IP backbones, replacing Frame Relay and ATM.

★ IPv6

- ★ OSI Layer 3 technology replacing IPv4.
- ★ Action Plan for the deployment of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) in Europe.

★ DNSSEC

- ★ A technology improving the security of Domain Resolution Service.

MPLS - Multiprotocol Label Switching

★ Features Overview

- ★ Provides a Layer 2 connection-oriented transport mode through a Layer 3.
- ★ Enables class of service (CoS) tagging and prioritization of network traffic.

★ Drawbacks

- ★ Asymmetrical Data Plane
- ★ Slow reaction

★ IP based resilience schemes include

- ★ IP dynamic routing.
- ★ MPLS protection switching.

MPLS - Multiprotocol Label Switching

- ★ IP Based networks routing
 - ★ Each node makes its own routing decision.
 - ★ Use IP routing protocols to maintain consistent routing tables.
 - ★ The per-hop nature of IP routing decisions provides resiliency.
- ★ IP routing fundamental constraints
 - ★ Traffic always uses the shortest path to the destination.
 - ★ Critical links can get overloaded.
 - ★ Convergence time is too long for Real Time Applications.

MPLS - Multiprotocol Label Switching

- ★ The path of an MPLS Packet(LSP) can be
 - ★ Explicitly configured hop by hop
 - ★ Dynamically routed by CSPF
 - ★ A loose route
- ★ Traffic Engineering (TE)
 - ★ The shortest path with available bandwidth will be chosen
- ★ TE - Fast Reroute
 - ★ About 50ms
- ★ MPLS DiffServ - TE

IPv6

- ★ More addresses available
- ★ Simpler Header
- ★ Site Multihoming
- ★ IP Host Mobility
- ★ IPsec
 - ★ Authentication Header
 - ★ Encapsulating Security Payload



IPv6

- ★ More addresses available:
 - ★ Improved global reachability and flexibility
- ★ No need for Network Address Translation:
 - ★ NAT was a short-term solution
- ★ Addresses distribution allows prefix aggregation
 - ★ Smaller Routing Table


IPv6

★ **Simpler header:**

- ★ Provides better routing efficiency.
 - ★ No broadcasts and thus no potential threat of broadcast storms.
 - ★ No requirement for processing checksums.
 - ★ Simpler and more efficient extension header mechanisms.
 - ★ Flow labels for per-flow processing with no need to open the transport inner packet to identify the various traffic flows.
- ★ All comes to simpler software / hardware for the routers.
- ★ Fewer Bugs

★ Site Multihoming:

- ★ Multihoming to several Internet service providers (ISPs).
- ★ No need for Autonomous Systems
 - Current status 267.688
 - 1994 were 20.000
- ★ Transport sessions survive “rehomeing”



★ IPv6 Mobility

- ★ IPv4 mobility already used as extension of IP
 - ★ IPv6 mobile is designed at the same time with IPv6.
 - ★ IPv6 mobile tunnel is symmetrical.
-
- ★ 3GPP2 and 4G telephony standards are considering the use of MIPv6



IPv6

★ IP Security:

- ★ IPsec is already an extension for IPv4
- ★ Authentication Header (AH)
 - source authentication, connectionless integrity, and protection against replay
- ★ Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
 - confidentiality, source authentication, connectionless integrity, and replay protection

★ Securing the traffic between two hosts

- ★ Tunnel mode
- ★ Transport mode



DNSSEC

- ★ DNS Known Threats (RFC 3833)
 - ★ Packet Interception - monkey-in-the-middle attacks
 - ★ ID Guessing and Query Prediction
 - ★ Name Chaining - Cache Poisoning
 - ★ Betrayal By Trusted Server
 - ★ Denial of Service
 - ★ Wildcards

DNSSEC


- ★ Domain Name System Security Extensions.
- ★ DNSSEC features:
 - ★ End-to-end data integrity check.
 - ★ DNS data origin authentication.
 - ★ Data integrity.
 - ★ Authenticated denial of existence.
- ★ Does not protect Client to Resolver Communication
 - ★ Use TSIG to ensure the integrity with a recursive name server.

★ Weaknesses

- ★ Answer validation increases the resolver's work load.
- ★ Denial of Service.
- ★ Trust model is almost totally hierarchical.
- ★ Key rollover at the root is really hard.
- ★ Betrayal By Trusted Server still exists as threat.
- ★ Zone Walking

MTP1 - Improving Resilience in European e-Communication networks

Collectively evaluate and improve resilience in European e-Communication networks



By 2010, the Commission and at least 50% of the Member States have made use of ENISA recommendations in their policy making process

WPK 1.3 – Background Info

★ Objectives

- ★ Analyze current and emerging technologies used by network and service providers to enhance the resilience of their operations

★ Scope

- ★ IP backbone technologies

★ Stakeholders

- ★ Equipment vendors, network operators, services providers
- ★ Research institutes and standardization bodies
- ★ Policy makers


★ Target Group

- ★ Regulators and Policy Makers
- ★ Operators
- ★ Vendors

Approach - Status

- ★ Selection of topics & stakeholders.
 - ★ Consultation workshop, Q1 08, Brussels
- ★ Consultation with stakeholders.
 - ★ Interviews, Expert groups (Q3 & Q4 08)
- ★ Analysis of resilience enhancement of existing and emerging technologies.
 - ★ (Q4 08)
- ★ Validation of findings with experts and stakeholders.
 - ★ Consultation workshop 12th and 13th of November

Future Networking Trends



Summarizing

- ★ Importance of the Resilience of public eCommunication networks;
- ★ Technologies benefits are well recognized however the economical / political incentives have to be made;
- ★ References
 - ★ <http://www.enisa.europa.eu>
 - ★ <http://www.enisa.europa.eu/sta/>

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