

Cloud Security under the EU Data Protection Directive and draft General Data Protection Regulation

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
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Introduction


■ Self – 4 x



3 x



2 x



■ CLP, MCCRC & A4Cloud

■ Questions – please leave till Panel session

Data Protection Directive – recap

- “Controller” (“purposes & means”) legally-obliged to comply with data protection (DP) principles when processing personal data (PD); regulated by national DPAs
 - + rules for “special category” sensitive data e.g. health
 - “processing” incl. storage, transmission – digital data
 - controller may use “processor” to process PD for it
 - incl. cloud provider
 - controller remains responsible / liable !

Cloud computing - recap

- Use of IT resources over a network (typically the Internet), scalable up / down with demand
 - **SaaS** – IT resources = software applications
 - E.g. webmail, Facebook, Salesforce, Office 365, Google Apps, Dropbox
 - **IaaS** – IT resources = raw IT resources (storage, compute, networking) e.g. Amazon Web Services
 - **PaaS** – IT resources = platform for developing, hosting, deploying software apps e.g. Microsoft Azure
- Public (shared), private, hybrid

Cloud – key points

- Benefits – costs-savings and flexibility
 - efficiencies & economies of scale – through use of **shared, standardised, commoditised resources**, PAYG / free
 - agility, innovation – startups save on capex
- Risks – supply chain, **third party resources**
 - possible provider “layers” (“sub-processors”)

Customer ---- DropBox ---- Amazon
SaaS **IaaS**

- renting “someone else’s computer”

“Security” under DPD – Art. 17

- National differences, but...
 - “appropriate **technical and organizational measures** to protect personal data against **accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access...** and against ***all other unlawful forms of processing***” - > technical security
 - ensure security level “**appropriate to the risks**” of the processing and nature of the data - **state of the art, cost** – i.e., risk-based approach

If using processor for PD

- Part of “Security” under Art. 17
- Controller must:
 - pre-contract - choose a processor providing **sufficient guarantees** re. “security”
 - written contract with processor –
 - act only on “**instructions**” from controller
 - equivalent security obligations on processor
 - post-contract - ensure compliance
 - still responsible & liable

WP196 - Art. 29 Working Party (2012)

- Cloud - loss of control & lack of transparency
- Pre-contract - risk assessment (e.g. ENISA's)
 - incl. DP compliance of contract - esp. **security obligations, international transfers**
- Contract “must”, generally:
 - allocate responsibility (esp. if **sub-providers**)
 - contain "standardised" DP safeguards incl. -
 - tech / org measures, data export, **accountability mechanisms** e.g. audits / certifications
 - & more – SLAs / penalties, purpose; sub-processor consent, location, contract; data subject access...
- N.B. authoritative but non-binding...

Cloud security - reality

- Differing degrees of control – **not one size fits all !**

SERVICE OWNER	SaaS	PaaS	IaaS
Data	Joint	Tenant	Tenant
Application	Joint	Joint	Tenant
Compute	Provider	Joint	Tenant
Storage	Provider	Provider	Joint
Network	Provider	Provider	Joint
Physical	Provider	Provider	Provider

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Cloud contracts – realities

- Providers' standard terms – negotiate ?
 - [practicalities of negotiating cloud contracts](#) research
 - public sector, financial services
- Pre-contractual info / audits re. provider security
 - individual audits impractical, can increase risks
 - independent third party expert audit, share summary
 - industry-standard security / cloud certifications / codes
 - e.g. ISO27001, ISO27018, CSA CCM, CIF Code
 - NB. assess against *own* position / risks – DPAs

Cloud contracts – security terms

- Security requirements – whose security policy ?
 - standardised – vs. different customers, conflicts ?
- Security audit rights; logging obligations
 - WP196 – third party auditor chosen by **controller**
 - regulated sectors like financial services
- Disclose data to authorities: legally-binding ?
- Breach notification / handling
- Deletion – WP196: all copies, “irretrievably” ?
 - “pointers” – Google Apps

Problems with current laws & cloud

- Laws based on 1970s outsourcing ([12Cs](#), [9Ds](#))
 - deliver data, processors' access to intelligible data, "active" processing as per controller's "instructions"
 - vs. direct **self-service** use of IT resources ("instructions" ?)
 - vs. shared, **standardised**, commoditised resources, at scale
 - vs. infrastructure provider **knowledge** of PD (e.g. encrypted)
 - rent a computer – manufacturer / rental co. not "processor"
 - location-independent – customers, providers, resources
 - logical remote access, physical (CNIL's [cloud guidance](#)...)
- GDPR *perpetuates* 1970s models / assumptions !

GDPR - progress

- Commission - [draft modernising General Data Protection Regulation \(GDPR \)](#) – Jan 2012
 - & separate crime / law enforcement Directive
- European Parliament – [different](#) – Mar 2014
- Council - yet [another version](#) – 1 June 2015
 - Presidency - Latvia now, Luxembourg July-Dec 2015
- Paper - [GDPR impact on cloud computing](#)
(under the [A4Cloud](#) EU project)

Key changes – moving target

- "Security" expanded + (new) **breach notification**
 - processor contract requirements - WP196 – perpetuating problems
- Processors – next
- New accountability provisions relevant to security
 - DPIA, prior consultation, DP by design & default
 - Certifications, seals, codes - shortly
- Strengthen DPA powers – but funding ? Fees abolished...
 - e.g. audits, & fines (5% turnover / €100m - Parliament)
- (+ others – International transfers - more restrictive;
Subject access, RTBF, data portability, “class actions”;
Jurisdiction & one-stop shop ([summary report](#)))

Processor obligations – security, etc.

- Data subjects could sue processors *directly*
 - burden of proof
 - personal use, no “controller” – user’s fault ?
 - recourse rights ?
- Fault-based allocation of liability, or strict ?
 - debate in Council
- (+ DPOs, transfers, record-keeping; prior consultation, DP by design / default (Parl))

Certifications, seals, marks, codes

- To engender trust – but costs; “DP” not security
- Legal incentives to encourage adoption ?
 - Council – “an element” to show compliance
 - detailed provisions on third party certifications etc.
 - Parl. – European DP Seal - DPA
 - fines - shield if non-negligent, non-intentional breaches
- Applies to controllers / processors only
 - cf. tech standards ? - new European Data Protection Board may certify tech standards as GPDR-compliant (Parl) – but legal status of use ?

The future ?

- Council's version – today / future ??
 - [timetable](#) ?
- EU institutions must agree **same** text before GDPR can become law – [flowchart](#)
 - “trilogue” – starting next week ??
 - conciliation ?
- Moving target !! + **[2] years after adoption**
- **Regulation** not Directive, to harmonise – but
 - specific areas of MS discretion (e.g. [Amberhawk](#))
 - ambiguity

Consequences ?

- “Guaranteed” security & strict liability worth the price ?
 - costs to customise, overwrite, vs. cheap commodity public cloud
- Risks – “infrastructure” providers raise prices; refuse services if EEA, PD etc; close EEA ops / free services; stop using EEA DCs ?
 - impact on innovation / services to EEA citizens
- Or will laws be ignored, if too wide ?
 - enforceability - but fines...
- Control of supply / contract chain
 - big cloud players may be winners – dictate contract terms, sub-processors, afford certifications etc.

Practical implications

- Cloud providers & other (sub-) processors - contracts
 - liability allocation, indemnities etc (& seek fault-based ?)
 - if strict liability is intended – GDPR needs to be much clearer
- Codes & certifications etc. - may have much increased role

Recommendations (personal !)

- Laws, including GDPR, don't (but should)
 - regulate only those with access to *intelligible* PD
 - Education re. controller self-help – encryption where feasible, backups
 - prohibit (or require contracts to prohibit) unauthorised “use or disclosure” by processors (incl. after termination), *not* “instructions”
- E-Commerce Directive intermediary defences should explicitly apply to personal data processing
 - e-commerce, innovation; fairness (knowledge)
- Processors, certifications etc. – clarify; consequences
- ENISA should be given a formal role under GDPR
 - Commission, EDPB etc. – obtain and take account of ENISA's advice on **all** security issues (not just cloud)

Security laws, more generally

Five Factors - MEERS

- **Multi-disciplinary meeting of minds**
 - *One track* - lawyers *and* technologists !
 - different mindsets – binary vs. analogue
 - terminology confusion - e.g. “data protection”
- **Evidence-based, expertise-informed law-making**
 - take account of expert advice incl. ENISA
- **Education, empowerment – lawmakers / regulators too**
- **Risk-based approach (vs. 100% security forever)**
- **Support sharing of security info suitably (> gov / orgs)**
 - reports by customers / others – encourage ethical disclosures, don't gag / jail / fire ! (breaches not discovered internally...)
 - examples

Thanks for listening !

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