


Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU



Building strong cybersecurity for the EU: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence

From reactive to pro-active and cross-policy approach bringing various work streams together to build EU's strategic cybersecurity autonomy
Improving resilience and response by boosting capabilities (technology/skills), ensuring the right structures are in place and EU cybersecurity single market functions well
Stepping up work to detect, trace and hold accountable those responsible for cyber attacks
Strengthening international cooperation as a platform for EU leadership on cybersecurity
Involving all key actors - the EU, Member States, industry and individuals to give cybersecurity priority it deserves







ICT cybersecurity certification

Towards a true cybersecurity single market in the EU



The issue

The **digitalisation** of our society generates greater need for **cyber secure** products and services

Cybersecurity **certification** *plays an important role in increasing trust of digital products and services*


Current landscape

- emergence of separate national initiatives lacking mutual recognition (e.g. France, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Italy)
- Current European mechanisms (SOG-IS MRA) have limited membership (12 MSs), involve high costs and long duration



Our proposal

A voluntary European cybersecurity certification framework....




...to enable the creation of individual EU certification **schemes** for ICT products and services...



...that are valid across the EU



How will the framework work in practice



In a nutshell: EC proposes & decides, Group advices (and may propose), ENISA prepares schemes



Core elements (i)

- No 'One size fits all' one EU Framework, many schemes
- Each scheme will specify:

- i) scope (pdct/service), ii) evaluation criteria, iii) assurance level, iv) security requirements v) rules for monitoring compliance

- Certificates from European schemes are valid across **all MSs**.
- Where a European scheme exists:
 - MSs cannot introduce new national schemes with same scope
 - Existing national schemes covering same pdct/service cease to produce effects
 - Existing certificates from national schemes are valid until expire date
- The use of EU certificates remains **voluntary**, unless otherwise specified in Union law.
- A EU scheme **should not conflict** with certification provisions from **other Union legislation** (e.g. data protection certification in GDPR).



Core elements (ii) National Authorities and European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG)

MSs will appoint a **national certification supervisory authority**. In their territory, each authority shall:

- **supervise** the activities of conformity assessment bodies (**CAB**) and the compliance of the certificates issued by CABs
- *be independent of the entities they supervise.*
- handle complaints on certificates issued by CABs
- withdraw certificates that are not compliant and impose penalties
- **participate** in the new European Cybersecurity Certification Group

The **Group** has the following tasks:

- **advises** the Commission and assists ENISA in the preparation of EU schemes
- **proposes** to the Commission that it requests ENISA to prepare a EU scheme
- **adopt opinions** addressed to the Commission relating to the maintenance and review of existing EU schemes
- The Commission chairs the Group and provides the secretariat with the assistance of ENISA



Core elements (iii) National Accreditation Bodies (NABs) & Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs)

- European cybersecurity **certificates** are normally **issued** by **CABs accredited** by a National Accreditation Body (**NAB**) Reg. 765/2008
 - Accreditation shall be issued for a maximum of five years
 - NABs can revoke accreditation of CABs
 - NABs notify the Commission of the accredited CABs for each EU scheme
- **However**, in **justified cases** a European scheme may provide that a **certificates** can only be **issued by a public body** such as:
 - a national certification supervisory authority
 - a body accredited as a CAB
 - a body established under national laws, meeting the requirements according to ISO/IEC 17065:2012.



Benefits...for citizens/end users

NOW



Difficult to distinguish between more and less secure products/services

FUTURE



more information on the security properties of product/services ahead of purchase



Co-existence of schemes makes comparison difficult...

...end-users (OES) refrain from buying certified products/services



Greater incentive for OES to buy certified products/service

Increased cyber resilience of critical infrastructures

...As end-users of digital solutions, **governments** would rely on an institutional framework to identify and express priority areas needing ICT security certification.



...For vendors/providers

The possibility to obtain cybersecurity certificates that are valid across the EU would:

- Generate higher incentive to certify and enhance the **quality** of digital products / services
- Enhance **competitiveness** through reduced **time** and **cost of certification**
- Help gain access to market segments where certification is required
- Contribute to promote a **chain of trust between** vendors **and** end-users

For SMEs and new business...

• Elimination of a potential market-entry barrier



Thank you for your attention!

