

Two Aspects of Exercising Cyber Incidents

Susanne Jantsch

Federal Office for Information Security
Situation Centre and CERT-Bund

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Outline

Two aspects of exercising cyber incidents:

□ On the “local” scale:

Internal (ICT) incident and emergency management

□ On the “global” scale:

Management of a (nation-wide) crisis due to ICT incidents

Internal incident and emergency management

- ❑ BCM → should comprise ...
- ❑ No BCM?
 - ❑ Start your BCM process (e.g. via BSI Standard 100-4) or follow special requirements or...
 - ❑ At some point will include: **Do exercises**

Note: so far, not limited to ICT/cyber

Internal **ICT** incident and emergency management


❑ ICT emergency exercises? How?

❑ What kind of exercises?

For more info, see last slide

❑ How to get started?

❑ Too much effort?!



Idea: provide a semi-finished product

Sample Exercises

- ❑ “Generic”, not too complex **exercise “template” sets**
 - ❑ Tabletop exercise
 - ❑ ICT emergency plan test
 - ❑ COMEX
- ❑ Realistic scenarios (e.g. DDoS, malware infections, insider jobs, loss of reputation, political impact)
- ❑ Purpose
 - ❑ **Facilitate internal exercises**
 - ❑ **Reduce preparation efforts**
 - ❑ Minimum: just customise to the institution (fill in names, roles, time ...)
 - ❑ **Recommended**: Think! Adapt to **YOUR** organisational needs!
 - ❑ Optional: introduce org-specific details, increase complexity, ...

Contents of a sample exercise

□ Brief description

- Scenario outline
- Recommended audience
- Purpose
- Complexity /effort


□ Exercise concept

□ Slides or script

□ Templates for

- Invitations
- Protocol
- Report

□ Extra material where required, depending on exercise




1. Übungsrahmen

3. Übungsablaufplan

	Stelle	Name	Kontaktdaten
Planungsteam	<eintragen>	<eintragen>	<eintragen>
Moderator	<eintragen>	<eintragen>	<eintragen>
Übende (Schlüsselteilnehmer, Kompetenzträger)	<eintragen>	<eintragen>	<eintragen>
Übungsbeobachter	<eintragen>	<eintragen>	<eintragen>
Auswertungsteam	<eintragen>	<eintragen>	<eintragen>
Mögliche externe Beteiligte	Unternehmen/Behörde <eintragen>	Name <eintragen>	Kontaktdaten <eintragen>
Geplanter Übungsstart	Datum <tt.mm.jjjj>	Uhrzeit <00:00 Uhr>	

Aim: “give and take”



The other aspect

**When “local” cyber incidents aren't
as local as they seem...**

Crisis management exercise example: Germany's LÜKEX

- **LÜKEX** =
Länderübergreifende **K**risenmanagementübung/**E**xercise*
(cross-Länder crisis management command post exercise)
- Participants: Crisis management staffs from federal and Länder levels plus CIP plus selected participants on community level
- Series of Exercises
 - 2004: Power Outage
 - 2005: Big Sports Event (Preparation for WM 2006)
 - 2007: Pandemia
 - 2009/10: Terrorist attacks and threats (dirty bomb)
- Duration: about 2 days

*Organised by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) under the auspices of the BMI

LÜKEX 11

- ❑ Theme of LÜKEX 11: cyber incidents
- ❑ However: LÜKEX 11 was **NOT** a cyber exercise
 - ❑ It was still a **strategic crisis management exercise**
 - ❑ **It used an ICT scenario**
- ❑ Audience (as in the LÜKEXes before)
 - ❑ general crisis management staff (high policy level)
 - ❑ police officers, firefighters, disaster recovery, civil protection, ...

*CERTs, CISOs, CIOs, IT service providers etc.
participated from the second row*

LÜKEX 11

Scenario overview

- ❑ ICT incidents had increased steadily before STARTEX
- ❑ At STARTEX
 - ❑ Knowledge about a new malware, but little details
 - ❑ Warning that “more will happen” on exercise day one
 - ❑ Several incidents hit the media
- ❑ During the exercise
 - ❑ Additional incidents occurring “locally”, all participating parties hit, some more, some not so bad.
 - ❑ (Fictitious) sample analysis reveals step by step details of the highly complex malware with several malicious functionalities
 - ❑ First consequences that are felt by the population
 - ❑ The media receive anonymous hints
 - ❑ Data leakages occur

LÜKEX 11

The challenges for the participants

- ❑ CM staff had to **deal with the CONSEQUENCES** on ICT
 - ❑ Assessment and plan of actions
 - ❑ Requires listening and talking to the ICT specialists
 - ❑ Integration of new aspects in the situational picture
 - ❑ Crisis communication!
- ❑ CERTs, ICT CM staffs, CISOs, CIOs, IT service providers in **two roles**
 - ❑ Acting as **advisers to their CM staff**
 - ❑ Responsible for **dealing with the (fictitious) ICT incidents** in their own realm
 - ❑ Assessment and coordination of measures
 - ❑ What information to share
 - ❑ Use information / advice coming in via information sharing

Lessons from LÜKEX as a combined exercise

- ❑ Use **existing** structures (here: crisis management)
- ❑ CM staff ARE dependent on ICT. **Make them aware!**
 - ❑ Make them understand the basics of your field
 - ❑ Translate the complex things!
 - ❑ Explain the differences
 - e.g.: ICT is ubiquitous, instantaneous and simultaneous
- ❑ The non-ICT partners are also experts. **Learn from them!**

Here: Staff organisation and staff work
- ❑ Cooperation with cyber-dependent parties is more than cooperation of their CIOs and CISOs...

Contact

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)

Dr. Susanne Jantsch
Godesberger Allee 185-189
53175 Bonn

Tel: +49 (0)22899-9582-5026
Fax: +49 (0)22899-10-9582-5026

susanne.jantsch@bsi.bund.de
www.bsi.bund.de
www.bsi-fuer-buerger.de
www.bsi.bund.de/IT-Krisenmanagement



Related links

- ❑ CIP Implementation Plan

 - <https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Criticalinfrastructures/Impleme>

- ❑ IT Emergency and Crisis Management Exercises

 - <http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/560098/publicatio>

- ❑ COMCHECK and ALEX

 - <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Kritis/co>

- ❑ BSI Standard 100-4

 - ❑ https://www.bsi.bund.de/ContentBSI/EN/Publications/BSI_standar