Enhanced Attribution

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Proposers Day Briefing

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Develop mechanisms and algorithms to:

- 1. Collect and fuse all-sources information to enable at-scale attribution of individual malicious cyber operators
- 2. Validate and enrich the collected corpus with additional information to enable convincing public attribution of malicious cyber activity



Entity	Sources	Accuracy	Timeliness	Scale	Shareability
Commercial	Blue space	low	low	low	high
Government	Red space	high	low	low	low
Enhanced Attribution	Red & Blue	high	high	high	high

• If successful, we will enable a range of response options, including many that require public disclosure of evidence





The same campaign attributed to 4 different intrusion sets by 3 commercial cybersecurity providers, based on different observables



"Attribution is really really hard ... we're using the totality of the sources and methods we have to help inform that. [But] because those advanced persistent threats aren't going away ... we can't bring all that information to the fore and be fully transparent about everything we know and how we know it."

- Rob Joyce, Chief NSA/TAO at USENIX Enigma 2016

Q: Who is UglyGorrilla?

A: Wang Dong





Monitoring and Understanding of Adversary Cyber Operator Actions Through Collection in Red Space





- Create software modules for tracking adversary operators from various vantage points
 - Assume initial access and communications channel is provided
 - Ops desktop, mobile phone, IoT, captured C2 nodes, network infrastructure, ...
 - Track personas, extract relevant cyber actions, and link personas to identities
- Possible approaches
 - Behavioral biometrics techniques
 - Decompose attack software toolchain into units of action (e.g., port scan, send spearphishing email); extract and emit associated metadata (which represents ground truth)
- Challenges
 - Maintaining a low computational-resource profile requires new algorithmic approaches to behavioral biometrics
 - Software partitioning and whole-system analysis at low footprint **Keyboard Capture Intervals**

Keyboard/Mouse/Touch behavioral biometrics





- Develop multi-INT fusion and tracking for the cyber domain
 - Key enabler: ground truth generated by TA1
- Develop predictive profiles using downstream observables
- Capture ambiguous data associations across diverse data set
- Possible approach: heterogeneous information networks
 - Leverage, reason over, and contribute to structure
 - Scalable and extensible to support wide range and types of data

Challenges

Association Ambiguity

Out of Sequence Data

Large Data Volume





- Identify adversary mistakes and externally observable indicators
 - Pattern-matching over an activity graph
 - Fuse and integrate external information sources
 - Compose disclosable explanatory narrative
- Use analytic techniques to expose known but hidden structure
- Create convincing explanation using external data
 - Operate fast enough to make use of rich but transient data

Adversary Mistakes Weak passwords Vulnerable software Weak cryptography

Infrastructure reuse



External Indicators				
OSINT				
Commercial Threat Feeds				
Network IDS/analytics				
End Host (e.g. HBSS)				



- Program duration: 54 months
 - Three 18-month program phases
- All TAs working in parallel
- Frequent informal evaluations using various datasets
 - Increasing realism/environments
- Be in position to conduct on-demand testing in real conditions as opportunities arise, possibly starting early in the program

	Year 1	Yea	ar 2	Year 3	Year 4	Yea	ar 5
	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		
TA1 Profile/Activity Precision	60%		75%		90%		
TA2 Reconstruction Precision	35%		50%		75%		
TA3 Enrichment Completeness	20%		35%		50%		



- Each performer conducts their own evaluation for each phase
 - Provide data and prototypes to DARPA and AFRL to conduct an independent validation
 - Government reserves the right to engage third parties to independently validate the results
 - DARPA anticipates integrated evaluations early in the program
- DARPA will pursue access to unclassified data sets
 - Proposers strongly encouraged to pursue their own data sets that will facilitate initial development



- The program will be conducted at the UNCLASSIFIED level
 - Technical development
 - Performer-internal testing
- TA2 and TA3 teams required to include personnel with TS clearance and eligible for SCI
 - Adequate number to allow for extensive T&E in the Washington, DC area
 - Not all team personnel need to be cleared
 - For multi-organization teams, not all participating organizations must have cleared personnel
 - No requirement for SCIF access
- TA1 teams encouraged to include personnel with similar clearances



- Depending on technical approach, TA1 teams may need to consider HSR implications
- DARPA encourages TA1 teams to consult their IRB and address this matter in their proposals
 - Ideal scenario: proposal includes letter with IRB determination
 - Second best scenario: proposal includes submission to IRB



- Proposals due on June 7, 2016
- Anticipated program start date: 1 November 2016
- One proposal per organization as Prime
- Procurement Contract or Other Transaction (no Grants)
- To expedite award contracting, proposers are encouraged to have sub-award agreements in place ahead of award notification
- Anticipated number of awards
 - TA1: multiple
 - TA2: one or more
 - TA3: one or more
- Proposals may address any combination of TAs
 - Technical work and cost must be separable to enable partial selection
- TA2 performers must be prepared to work with all TA1 and TA3 teams



- Two Annual Principal Investigator (PI) Meetings
- Quarterly Technical Reviews between PI Meetings
- Monthly Progress Reports
 - Technical Report describing progress, resources expended and issues requiring Government attention, provided 10 days after the end of each month
- Financial/Technical Progress Reporting to the DARPA Technology Financial Information Management System (TFIMS)
- Final Technical Report
- See BAA for full details
- Anticipate high frequency interactions with DARPA technical team
- Agent: AFRL/RIGB