INTERNATIONAL STAFF
EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES

NATO CIS SERVICES AGENCY NATO INFORMATION ASSURANCE TECHNICAL CENTRE







Background



- Threats in the Cyber Space.
- Some milestones in Security Awareness:
 - Estonia
 - Georgia
 - Mariposa botnet
 - Stuxnet



Background




- Strategy overview
 - Prague Summit
 - NCIRC Initial Operating Capability
 - 1st Cyber Defense Policy
 - CDMA
 - NATO 2020 Report
 - Creation of Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD)
 - Lisbon Summit, November 2010



ESCD Structure







NATO Cyber Defence



NATO-wide CD management & Direction

CYBER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT BOARD

- Policy development
- National level liaison

CYBER DEFENCE COORDINATION & SUPPORT CENTRE

NHQ ESC Division

- CERT services
- IDS Management
- Engineering
- Vulnerability management
- Scientific services

NCIRC TECHNICAL
CENTRE

NIATC / NCSA

Local Information Assurance management

NATO CIS OPERATING AUTHORITIES


All NATO HQs and Agencies

e)



Cyber Defence Roadmap







Cyber Defence Collaboration



- Collaboration between Nations, Partners and other Organisations
- Central Governance
- Cyber Defence Exercises
- NATO Information Assurance Symposium
- Science for Peace and Security Programme
- Collaboration with CCDCOE



NATO Lisbon Summit



- Develop further CD capabilities
- Update NATO CD policy & plans
- Centralized CD services for NATO
- Achieve NCIRC FOC by 2012
- Better integration of NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations • More engagement with EU and

UN



Active Engagement - Modern Defence













Viewed by security event analysts after customized filtering







Average number of incidents created







Percentage of botnet related incidents



NATO is a target



- Politically motivated cyber activists
 - DDoS
 - Web site defacement

- Fame seeking attackers
 - Mostly intent on web site defacement



Botnets, mass malware, etc.

- Cyber espionage
 - Targeted attacks
 - Bot characteristics



NATO and Botnets

Bot

Bot






- DDoS
- Spam
- Network scan for vulnerabilities

Bot infection malware


- Both targeted and global attacks
- Information theft
- Compromising user accounts / passwords





Cyber Attacks by Botnets







Cyber Attacks by Botnets



- Spam
 - NATO Case: Wrongly configured mail server
 - 25,000 bots relaying spam
 - Re-configuration and resolution of case

- Vulnerability Scanning
 - Executed by botnet
 - Leads to possible exploit attempt after discovery





Bot Infection Malware



- Global mass malware
 - Affecting all internet users, public
 - Rimecud, Pushbot, Virut, Zbot, Conficker, etc.
 - New variants regularly appear
 - Relatively easy to collect information
 - Global exposure means global reaction
 - Security vendors prepare reports
 - Close collaboration with vendors







Bot Infection Malware



Targeted Attacks

- Several unique attempts every month
- Weaponized documents (mostly PDFs)
- Using 0-day vulnerabilities
- Several layers of obfuscation
- Totally new sample, no prior detection
- Reverse engineering INDISPENSABLE







Bot Infection Malware



- Targeted Attacks (cont.)
 - Close collaboration with vendors
 - Customized detection signatures
 - Reverse engineering malware
 - Rapid reaction by collaboration of several layers
 - Blocking at perimeter firewall
 - IDS / IPS updated with custom signatures
 - Tracking of vulnerability and implementing workarounds and patches





OTAN Collaboration against Botnets



- National CERTs (Military & Civilian)
 - POC for incidents concerning their nation




- Information sharing
- Monitoring NATO IP addresses
- ISPs
 - Access to powerful traffic monitoring and analysis tools
 - Help in reacting to incidents
- Security vendors



Protecting NATO Networks







Protecting NATO Networks



Challenges

- Network access control
- Removable media!!!
- Patch management
- Timely update of AV definitions





Directives & Guidance



- Technical directives, guidance documents
- Perimeter and network security
 - Firewalls
 - Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems
- Host-based protection mechanisms
 - Centrally managed anti-malware, anti-spyware
 - Device / port control
- Web Proxy
- Patch management
- Regular vulnerability assessments



Directives & Guidance



- Strict configuration and change management process
 - Penetration testing
 - Compatibility testing
- Centrally managed security settings
 - OS, virtual environments, mobile devices
- Security accreditation
 - Projects
 - Networks
- SecOPs for all IT equipment, network access



Security Education




- Constant security training
 - Both technical and managerial aspects
- User Awareness
 - Mandatory security briefings
 - Posters, flyers, screensavers, wallpapers, Bulletins
 - Online situational awareness training material





User Awareness









Conclusion







Botnet cases at NATO



- Case 1
 - 00:03 Shadowserver report 2 NATO IPs
 - Connection to a known Conficker C&C
 - 00:10 Deputy Director NCIRC gets informed via phone call
 - 01:00 Security Event Analyst starts working on the incident
 - Does full packet capture analysis and IDS checks
 - Confirms bot infections, not targeted
 - 02:00 Both sites get notified
 - Advice on clean-up steps
 - Before next morning:
 - Both systems re-imaged, minimum user impact



Botnet cases at NATO



- Case 2
 - 10:07 Custom IDS signature triggers
 - 10:08 Incident Handlers notified by Analyst
 - Incident Handling Officers liaise with remote site
 - 10:23 Security Event Analyst discovers vector
 - Download of FakeAV
 - Reconstructs sample and forwards to anti-malware
 - Watches out for data egress
 - 10:45 Analyst observes data egress
 - in the form of machine name, OS, browser version, timezone, logged-on user, etc.



Botnet cases at NATO



- Case 2 (cont.)
 - 10:46 Bot receives command from HTTP server
 - Sleep for two hours
 - 11:08 Sample reverse-engineering complete
 - Results confirm C&C address
 - Further C&C addresses are discovered
 - 11:20 Security Event Analyst updates custom signatures on IDS
 - 11:20 Discovered C&C addresses are blocked at firewalls
 - 11:36 Site confirms re-imaging of infected host



Questions





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